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1. INTRODUCTION
The issue of space debris has already for some time
been very high upon the agenda of scientists, worrying
about the hture possibilities to undertake astronomical
observations from earth. Currentlv,
., these worries are
increasingly spreading to the public at large, in view of
the risks of damage being caused on earth - the deorbiting of Mir, in a way the largest piece of space
debris ever, was a media issue for many weeks. And
even commercially oriented entities are rapidly coming
to realise that the growing amount of tiny objects in
outer space will not just obstmct or endanger scientific
exploration, but also the commercial exploitation of
outer space.
Hence, the issue has also worried legal experts, e.g. in
the context of UNCOPUOS where it is a recurring
agenda item. Here, however, some caution must be had.
Legal experts have been discussing legal aspects of
space debris for quite some time, and actually many
legal proposals have seen the light of day, from fairly
simple extensions of interpretations of legal terms to
challenging new instruments.
For example, a few years ago a scientific team at the
Department of Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering
at the University of Arizona had devised a spectacular
project to actually go out into debris-rich orbits with a
space garbage collector - the ASPOD [I]. It was even
patented - patents representing a legal instrument
clearly used to achieve either a scientific or a
commercial objective (or both) - but, as it turned out,
the patent was never used. Actual building, launch and
operation of the ASPOD would have cost millions of
US dollars without bringing, as such, direct financial
benefits to those paying those dollars.
Thus, in the last resort it is not law that will solve the
problem of space debris, or at least solve it on its own.
Once money andlor political will are there, law will be
able to offer a number of interesting mechanisms for
trying to ensure that such money would be well spent
and such political will would be translated into useful
practical results. But as long as the solutions that exist
are seen as costing too much money or as resulting in
unacceptable checks on national sovereignty, with
perhaps a few interesting exceptions legal solutions
would remain merely sleeping solutions. Would the
waiting not perhaps be for a crucial triggering event,
waking everyone up to the danger?

Fortunately, recent developments seem to suggest that
such a crucial event would perhaps not be necessary;
that the mere accumulation of, as such as of yet still
minor, problems make states and other relevant players
more willing to consider real improvements, perhaps
even at the cost of substantial sums of money or of
sovereignty. Hence, it may be rather timely to take a
second look at what the law would be able to contribute
in this regard.

2. SPACE DEBRIS AVD INTERNATIONAL
SPACE LAW
The word "space debris" is wholly absent from
international space law - i.e. the five treaties commonly
known as 'space treaties' plus five United Nations
General ~'sembly ~esolutions providing for
authoritative, albeit as such non-binding principles [2].
Without yet going into definitional issues, there is little
more than the one clause in the Outer Space Treaty's
Article IX coming close to dealing with this issue. It
provides in particular that, in case of potentially
harmhl effects being foreseen as a consequence of a
particular space activity, the state undertaking the
activity should inform and consult, within the limits of
reasonableness, the other states possibly concerned.
There is, however, no such thing as a clear and
unconditional prohibition of causing space debris by
one's activities in the first place, or an obligation of
removing it once it has come into existence.
Worthy of mentioning is further the Resolution of 1992
on the use of Nuclear Power Sources, since it at least
provides for some general guidelines for the safe
operation of a special category of hazardous space
activities, i.e. those involving the use of nuclear power
sources. Obviously, this is of importance when it comes
to the prevention of space debris, although one has to
take note of the fact that the Principles as such are not
formally binding, and of a rather technical character.
In addition, a few more Articles may be quoted that are
of much wider relevance than just for this issue, but
nevertheless have some specific impact also here once
it comes to legal ways for dealing with space debris.
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty thus provides that
states are internationally responsible for national
activities in outer space, including those of nongovernmental entities and international organisations.
In other words: once relevant obligations 1-e space
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debris-prevention or -mitigation are to be established, it
is up to the relevant states to ensure that also private
entities and intergovernmental organisations will
adhere to such rules. [3]
By contrast, Article I1 of the Outer Space Treaty
provides for the absence of sovereignty, at least on a
territorial basis, in outer space. For the issue of fighting
space debris with legal means and instruments, this
means that new rules and obligations as regards that
area can never be established by a single state, but have
to be principally established at the international level.
National laws to be applied on a territorial basis do not
apply; national laws to be applied on a personal basis
only can be applied to those cases where a state's own
nationals are the relevant actors, i.e. not on a
comprehensive basis. [4]
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty to some extent
mitigates the above consequence of the absence of
sovereignty in outer space by providing that a state may
(continue to) exercise jurisdiction over a space object
carried on its national registry also when it is in outer
space [5]. Thus, it may legally provide for rules and
obligations regarding its operation in outer space that
may diminish the potential harmful impact of space
debris, even uftev the space object has already entered
outer space.
Finally, the Rescue Agreement is worth mentioning
here, since it deals with space objects likely damaged
andor posing certain threats to cause damage in the
course of their return to earth. The purport of the legal
regime provided by the Agreement, however, is to
provide for assistance-related obligations and a safe and
expeditious return home of the space object and
possible astronauts on board, not to deal with any
potentially harmful aspects of such space objects in
their possible quality of 'space debris'.
In the end, one anyhow has to realise that space debris
is not, legally speaking, an ethical, scientific or
academic problem in itself, but constitutes a problem
because of some of its practical consequences and
ramifications. Hence, it is usually phrased by lawyers in
terms of the damage caused by such debris and any
liability for it, as the most down-to-earth aspect of these
consequences and ramifications. This leads to three
major problems to be solved.
3. THE DEFINITIONAL ISSUE: 'SPACE
DEBRIS' AND 'SPACE OBJECT'
The first question that arises in this regard concerns
to what extent space debris would still fall within the
definition of "space object" or "component parts"
thereof, so as to trigger application of the Liability
Convention in cases of damage. Here, providing for
an authoritative international interpretation of space
debris would certainly be an interesting option. Many
such efforts have indeed been undertaken. In
particular Professor Perek has spent considerable
attention to this issue. [6]
The underlying problem is that also "space object" has
nnt heen defined in anv n~hqtantial manner The firqt
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effort at definition of Art. I(d) of the Liability
Convention and Art. I(b) of the Registration
Convention does not do much more than shift the issue,
by including in the scope of the term "space object"
also its "component parts". Nevertheless, it has
generally been agreed upon, that this at least provides
for a rather extensive scope: the classical example of a
screwdriver let loose in outer space still being a
component part of the space object it originally came
from.
Consequently, few would dispute that for example
large parts of a satellite after its explosion would also
constitute component parts, and hence be equated with
space objects. The major advantage thereof is that any
damage then caused by such component parts would
fall within the scope of the Liability Convention, i.e.
leading at least to a theoretical possibility of
compensation. [7]
Practical problems would still arise in view of the fact
for example that the dispute settlement mechanism
under the Liability Convention, in case the liable
state(s) do not accept to pay after diplomatic
consultation, does not pev se lead to a binding decision.
Such a binding decision can only result if both parties
to the dispute so agree beforehand, which may not be
the case too often. [8]
A more fundamental problem arises with another legal
aspect of space objects. While the definition as such of
a certain piece of metal as a "space object" is necessary
(though not sufficient) to trigger application of the
Liability Convention, it also triggers possible
application of Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty
and the Registration Convention.
A space object after all can be - and usually indeed is registered nationally, which means that the registration
state retains jurisdiction and control over it - and calls,
legally speaking, for solution of salvage problems
similar to those in the law of the sea. Is anyone else but
the owner of (and, in this case, also the sovereign over)
the space object entitled to establish control over it,
even if it is useless, for the reason that it is endangering
the former's life or interests or has already caused
damage thereto, and for the consequent purpose of
deflecting such dangers or collecting evidence? Should
an act of 'abandonment' explicitly take place, or be
presumed? Such legal issues, if remaining unsolved,
will certainly hamper any ASPOD-like or other debrismitigating activity in outer space.
Intev uliu for such reasons a definition which would
establish space debris as a sub-category within "space
objects" or "component parts", namely a sub-category
subject to liability but not to the continuation of
jurisdiction and control, or at least allowing for
abandonment andlor salvage-like rights of other states
or actors involved, might be desirable.
Thus, amongst others Professor Perek tends to lean
towards a definition of space debris focusing on the
(lack of) usefulness of the space object, since it would
obviously be easier for a registration state to accept
ahandnnment and/or action< h v other <tat?<i f it dne<
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not have any use anymore for that space object. In other
words: a space object should be considered space
debris as soon as it stops having any sort of practical
function, while remaining a space object for liability
purposes nevertheless (albeit, logically speaking, only
where the salvor does not incur liability himself for
specific actions undertaken with the space object in
question and the consequences of such actions).
Obviously, then, first of all, one would have to
elaborate what further consequences are to be exactly
attached to such a new sub-category of space objects.
More importantly, however, is that this discussion is of
relevance only for those space objects or component
parts which are large or distinct enough to be identified
- and hence for the liable state(s) to be identified. This,
however, is only applicable to a minor part of the space
debris floating around in outer space, at least
quantitatively speaking.

4.
THE
IDENTIFICATION
ISSUE:
STRENGTHENING
THE
REGISTRATION
CONVENTION
Thus, secondly the practical problem of identification
has to be faced: in case a certain piece of space debris
can not be relatedlequated to a specific space object,
effective operation of the Liability Convention for the
purpose of redeeming damage is precluded. More
stringent and comprehensive application in practice of
the Registration Convention would have some positive
effects in this respect, although it would never be able
to solve the problem altogether.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile here to briefly consider
efforts currently or possibly being undertaken in this
respect. Establishment of the Registration Convention
for a large part was motivated by the desire to provide
for means of identifying the launching state or states of
a particular subject, in the event such space object
would cause damage recoverable under the Liability
Convention. Obviously, for space objects no longer
functioning properly, or more to the point to be
characterised as, alternatively having given rise to
space debris, this is of special importance.
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, by providing
registration states the option to (continue to) exercise
over space objects registered, at least stimulates actual
registration in a national register. Following upon this,
the Registration Convention does require international
notification, namely to the Secretary General of the
United Nations, of any space object so registered, thus
making it possible for any party so interested to become
aware of that space object's presence in outer space as
well as some of its operational parameters.
However, to begin with the obligation or even
suggestion of applying a proper registration mark was
not provided for, partly because from a practical
perspective it seemed to make little sense viz. be very
difficult to achieve in any satisfactory measure by
current technical means.
Also the parameters that were to be provided in
arrnrdanre with

Article TV(1) o f the Re~iqtratinn
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Convention to the UN Secretary General remained very
basic: only the general function and character of the
space object, plus a few fundamental orbital
parameters. Moreover, there was no formal requirement
to notify any change to these parameters, though the
possibility to do so was offered under para. (2).
More importantly, any notification anyhow under
Article IV(1) of the Registration Convention was only
"as soon as practicable", which could well turn out to
mean in actual fact 'after the space object had already
ceased hnctioning', or worse still, simply 'never'.
Especially with military or other strategic satellites, this
was an evidently attractive escape clause, but also in
many civil cases notification, if at all, was notoriously
late, imprecise or otherwise unsatisfactory.
Finally, the clause of Article IV(3) may be noted,
where provision is made for states notifying the UN
Secretary General that previously registered space
objects "no longer are in Earth orbit". This clause
however is even severely curtailed in its effectiveness
by two qualifications: "to the greatest extent feasible"
and "as soon as practicable".
In this respect, it is indeed interesting to refer to the
current efforts being undertaken in UNCOPUOS to
come to more stringent requirements for registration
states in terms of international notification to the
Secretary General. Especially the time frame for
notification is to be made shorter and more difficult in
law to circumvent, and also any changes in essential
parameters after launch and in-orbit delivery should
now become subject to obligatory notification. In this
respect, the growing practical relevance of in-orbit
lease or even sale, ideally leading to a proper reregistration requirement and procedure, should be
mentioned.
In the last resort however, obviously even
comprehensive universal adherence to much tightened
registration requirements will not be nearly sufficient to
solve this aspect of space debris - allowing victims of
damage caused by space debris to trace such damage
back to an identifiable launching, and hence liable,
state. Especially after break-ups, explosions or
collisions it may soon be impossible to 'reverseengineer' the track of tiny particles to the original,
clearly identifiable space object.

5. THE COMPENSATION ISSUE: TOWARDS A
GUARANTEE FUND?
This is where the third problem arises: how to deal with
the damage caused by those pieces of debris which can
not be retraced to a certain space object and thereby to
a certain launching state? Theoretically speaking,
options discussed by space lawyers and other experts
have tended to focus on mitigation or prevention of
such damage being caused in the first place.
Such a preventive option could be found e.g. in the
establishment of a worldwide monitoring system,
tracking debris not only in a more comprehensive
fashion than is already the case, but also making these
data available tn a11 t h n ~ enntentiallv intereqted NACA

Provided by the NASA Astrophysics Data System

is apparently doing an interesting and much welcomed
job with some measure of comprehensiveness, in
tracking all sorts of traceable objects down to quite
small sizes, and some other organisations such as
ESAIESOC, NASDA and Rosaviakosmos are also
building up capacity in this respect. Nevertheless, the
general impression is that this is as of yet far from
enough for satisfying the demand for transparent, easily
accessible and readily available information on all
potentially endangering space debris, especially the
smaller particles.
There may be some room in this regard, therefore, for
further capacity building, establishing a global and
interdependent system of monitoring, hopefully with
ever-increasing precision and detection-capabilities.
Nevertheless, this option clearly also has its
fundamental limits, not just when it comes to its proper
task - tracking and monitoring space debris, and
warning those potentially endangered by it - but even
more so when it comes to the more fundamental issue
of preventing damage from being caused by such space
debris.
Another preventive legal option relates to after-mission
planning, and in the case of private activities, the
inclusion of provisions regarding obligatory aftermission scenarios in relevant launch or space licenses
in the widest sense of the word, e.g. re-orbiting or deorbiting, or in a 'negative' sense prohibiting explosion.
A lesser option, maybe especially interesting as a
starting point, would be to merely require an aftermission scenario to be included, in order to start forcing
the operating entities at least to think seriously about
these issues.
Whilst this is clearly an interesting - and hence already
oftentimes discussed - venue, in the end it requires the
political will of states to accept for themselves or for
their private entities a certain additional economic cost.
This will probably only happen if a substantial number
of states will decide to accept such an extra costgenerating measure at the same time.
Furthermore, in case of private entities it indeed
requires the existence or establishment of a licensing
system, presumably under a national space law of some
sort, to implement such international consensus. In this
respect, it is noteworthy to realise that, so far, only
eight states have actually realised any measure of
comprehensive national space legislation including a
system for authorisation - if sometimes very
rudimentary only. This concerns, in more or less
chronological order, the United States, Norway,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation,
South Africa, Australia and the Ukraine. [9]
In addition, one might refer to the case of France,
which has at least realised a special form of
authorisation of Arianespace's launching activities in
conjunction with the other member states of the
European Space Agency, and is now in the process of
drafting a proper national space law. The latter also
applies, in varying degrees, to such European states as

as such important space-faring states as Japan, India,
Brazil and Argentina.
Nevertheless, in this area a lot remains to be done,
especially to the extent that a substantial form of
international harmonisation of national licensing
systems might be required to prevent the phenomenon
of 'flags of convenience', so well known from the law
of the sea, from arising. Potential space entrepreneurs
should not be able to shop for the most convenient
licensing requirements in this respect.
All such options, however, will be fundamentally
unable to preclude the occurrence of any damage as a
consequence of space debris, whether existing or
future. This brings us to the last option to be briefly
discussed here: that of establishment of an international
guarantee fund, similar to the one existing nationally in
many countries with regard to road transport, which
will compensate damage caused by unidentifiable space
debris. The h n d would be financed at least largely by
the active space-faring community, for example by an
obligatory contribution to it in the form of a particular
percentage of the launch cost.
More refined options would be, for example, to link the
contribution to the fund to a 'maximum probable loss',
to be determined in an objective way, for example
through the insurance premiums to the extent these
would provide for 'objective' (since resulting from
calculations by commercial enterprise guided by the
Invisible Hand of competition) and comparable
standards of risk, or similar devices. Not only would in
this way any launch contribute to the launch fund, but
also a substantial further impetus would be given to
individual launch providers to enhance the safety of
their operations further so as to diminish such
'maximum probable loss' or other relevant concept,
and hence their obligatory contribution.
It is obvious, that such elaborated additions to the
existing body of space law would require most
probably even more than an amendment, such as a
distinct treaty or protocol. In terms of strategy,
however, putting discussions of such proposals on the
agenda of the Legal Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS
might serve as a push to arrive at least at other, less farfetched and cumbersome additions required to enhance
the effectiveness of space law vis-d-vis the growing
problem of space debris.
Also, however, again one should realise that in regard
of private entities involved in particular in launching
activities, but indirectly certainly also those undertaking
other space activities, any such results can only be
achieved under the current configuration of
international law by means of national space laws and
their licensing systems. Thus, another element of
uncertainty and non-comprehensiveness is introduced
into the equation, to be tackled preferably by
UNCOPUOS and its Legal Subcommittee in providing
for obligatory core common elements of such licensing
systems in this respect.
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, it is encouraging to see that
increasingly not just scientists, but also the public at
large and the commercial sectors are becoming aware
of the potential threats to their interests caused by the
growing population of space debris. Thus, it would
seem the appropriate time now to start thinking and
discussing in detail the possible ways and means in
which 'law' can help mitigate the threats posed by
space debris, even if in the last resort one has to be
modest about the possibilities for law to achieve
effective results without the concurrence of money
and political will.
In furthering the positive contribution of the law to
the mitigation of the harmful consequences of space
debris, then, various entities would have to fulfil their
respective roles.
At the global international level it would be in
particular UNCOPUOS and its Legal Subcommittee
which should help develop the international
framework, including working towards harmonised
licensing regimes. Thus, efforts to arrive at coherent
and effective definitions of such key terms as "space
objects" and "space debris", and to develop rules
regarding abandonment and salvage-like rights when
a particular space objectlpiece of space debris has no
longer any visible function yet may substantially
threaten other state's interests, e.g. in terms of
operating satellites.
Also, more specific and substantive law may be
developed, if necessary firstly by means of 'soft',
non-binding law such as Resolutions, guidelines or
codes of conduct which later on could develop, if of
proven value and feasibility, into 'hard' law. This
should focus on establishing duties for any launching
party in earlier stages to provide for an after-mission
scenario of whatever nature, later on for particular
after-mission scenarios. The latter, stronger option
however likely requires more technical and scientific
research, e.g. as to the relative benefits and risks
involved in such scenario's as de-orbiting, re-orbiting
and passivation.
In case of private launch parties, of course, such
substantive duties would then have to be
implemented through licensing systems. This is,
consequently, where the second group of 'space
players' comes into the picture: the individual states.
Only they have the legal power and means to
effectively impose the relevant obligations upon
private operators, and monitor and enforce them, and
this will not change in the foreseeable future, in spite
of repeated clamours for a World Space Organisation
or similar ideas.
Thus, those states which already do have some sort of
licensing system should make sure that it will be
constantly tuned to whatever international guidelines,
codes of conducts or binding legal regulations will
prescribe, whereas those states not yet having such a
licensing system but nevertheless principally

space activities, should be pressured into establishing
such licensing system in line with current
international requirements.
A third important role finally is to be played by the
intergovernmental organisations. As mechanisms for
joint efforts of states they play a particularly
important role in space activities, and hence should
play a particular role also in leading the way.
Collective standards are to that extent already more
easily acceptable to individual states in that the
relative disadvantage borne by a state accepting the
costs of debris-mitigating measures as towards other
states not (yet) accepting them is shared with the
other member states. Also, in view of their public
international status, they may play an important role
in establishing international customary law, since
they may represent state practice andlor opinio juris
of a number of states.
Thus, such organisations as ESA and Intersputnik,
but also INTELSAT, IMSO and EUTELSAT to the
extent that these may still (continue to) be classified
as intergovernmental organisations, may have an
important pioneering role to play. A special mention
finally may be made here of the IADC, which,
though no intergovernmental organisation in itself,
also represents an important platform for relevant
individual states as well as ESA to establish an even
wider consensus on necessary, if perhaps costly
measures.
Whilst maybe it will never be possible to completely
fill the pit before the cow falls in (in reference to a
famous Dutch saying), there may still be a realistic
chance of at least making it so much shallower that
the cow, once one comes to fall in, will not fall as
deep and as painful as otherwise. Obviously, there
would already be great benefit for all mankind in
that. [lo]
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